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INTRODUCTION
In September 2006, Taalib-Din Uqdah, the man whom at least one
observer called "the Johnny Cochran of natural hair,"1 and the plaintiff in the
1993 braiding case Uqdah v. District of Columbia,2 went to Illinois to lead
braiders' efforts to eliminate braider licensing regulations. He calls himself a
"modem-day abolitionist" on a crusade against "the last legal bastion of chattel
slavery in the United States"-the cosmetology industry. 3 Uqdah claims that
the purpose of his endeavor is to "get[] the white man's foot off the black
woman's neck."4 Uqdah's fighting spirit has heartened braiders, dreadlock
stylists ("lockticians"), and state legislators, who are optimistic that a bill will
pass to amend the Illinois Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics and Nail Technology
Act of 1985 to exclude braiders from state regulation.5
In July 2006, Essence Farmer celebrated the opening of her natural hair
salon, Rare Essence Braiding Studio, in Glendale, Arizona. Just three years
earlier, the Arizona Board of Cosmetology had barred Farmer from opening her
salon until she completed 1600 hours of training-which would have cost
approximately $10,000 but would have included no instruction on natural
styling. In December 2003, Farmer filed suit against the board. Before the case
was resolved, the State amended its statute, thereby eliminating the application
of cosmetology licensing to braiders.
6
The Illinois and Arizona episodes are only two of the most recent examples
of a growing line of court challenges that have led to the elimination or
substantial curtailment of licensing requirements for braiders and natural hair
care providers 7 catering to black women. 8 This Comment analyzes a little-
1. Tasheem Paghdiwala, The Politics of Braids, CHI. READER, Sept. 1, 2006, at 1, available at
http://chicagoreader.com/features/stories/braids.
2. 785 F. Supp. 1015 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that braiding regulations do not violate the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clause), vacated, 995 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (unpublished disposition).
See infra Subsection lI.B. I.
3. Paghdiwala, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Sherry Ann Rubiano, Braiding Studio is a Result of Perseverance, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 2,
2006, http://www.azcentral.com/community/westvalley/articles/0802gl-braidO2Z I .html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2007). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-506 (2006).
7. For the purposes of this Comment, I use the designation of "braider" and "natural hair stylist"
interchangeably though, in reality, there are distinctions between what braiders and natural hairstylists
do. Natural hairstylists might perform a range of services that some braiders would not, such as
maintaining dreadlocks or styling loose black hair. Some natural stylists object to the use of hair
extensions, while hair extensions are an integral part of most professional braiders' work. This
distinction is of little relevance to this Comment's argument and thus, I use the terms interchangeably.
8. There is a fourteen-year span of relevant cases. E.g., Comwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101
(S.D. Cal. 1999); Uqdah v. Dist. of Columbia, 785 F. Supp. 1015 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated, 995 F.2d 306
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (unpublished disposition). At least seven lawsuits have been filed in these matters by
the Institute for Justice (IJ), a conservative-libertarian public interest legal organization, alone. See
http://www.ij.org/economic-liberty/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
[Vol. 19:125
The Braiding Cases
studied shift in the legal regulation of and for black women: the increasing
number of instances in which states have exempted hair braiders from
regulations that apply to other hairstyling professionals. Initially, braiders'
cases were fully litigated. In recent years, however, simply filing a lawsuit has
rushed braiding regulation to the top of the legislative or administrative agenda,
bringing a swift pre-trial remedy and making the case moot. The decision-
makers in the early braiding cases were judges, but increasingly, the political
branches are resolving these disputes.
9
Advocates for deregulation have made three arguments. First, they argue
that these licensing requirements are unnecessary because natural hairstylists
do not use harsh chemicals, meaning that there is little danger to their
customers. Second, they challenge requirements that natural hairstylists attend
cosmetology schools, which include minimal, if any, instruction on African
natural hair care. Many braiders and commentators have heralded the policy
changes, maintaining that certification requirements represent too much
governmental interference with a treasured cultural practice. °  Third,
deregulation proponents have also observed that braiding is an important source
of income for poor black women. The greater the cost of entry, the fewer
women who will be able to pursue this homegrown profession as a means of
achieving economic independence.11 However, few have asked whether the
deregulation of this industry is, on the whole, in the best interests of black
women, who are both providers and consumers of braiding services. What is at
9. This trend illustrates how impact litigation has goals other than merely winning cases. One
reason that deregulation advocates might choose to bring suits instead of engaging in pure legislative
advocacy is so they can force legislators to take up the issue. IJ Litigation Director Clint Bolick,
discussing Uqdah, confirms its use of lawsuits to create the publicity necessary to effect legislative
change:
This case ... demonstrates the efficacy of arguing in the court of public opinion. Favorable
coverage in the Wall Street Journal and other media followed the case throughout .... The
result was that while the case was pending on appeal, the District of Columbia became the
first jurisdiction in the United States to deregulate entry into the cosmetology profession.
Clint Bolick, IJ Litig. Dir., The Slaughter-House Cases: Dismantling Liberty's Slaughter-House, Dec. 1,
2005, http://www.institutefodrjustice.net/publications/other/slaughterhouse/dismantle.htm].
10. See, e.g., Braider Licensing Raises Issue of State Regulation vs. Culture, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES: Bus. ONLINE SEC., Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.sptimes.com/2006/09/22/Business/
Braider licensing-rai.shtml ("[C]an a school effectively teach part of a culture that is passed down
through generations, learned on front stoops and sidewalks?"); Braiding Without a License?, FREE
LANCE-STAR, Aug. 21, 2006, http://fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2006/082006/08212006/215520;
Paghdiwala, supra note 1; Rashard Zanders, Hairbraiders Put "Cosmetology Cartel" on Notice, MINN.
SPOKESMAN-RECORDER, Apr. 27, 2005, http://www.nappystories.com/main/nonfiction/cosmetology
cartel.htm. For more on the cultural value of braiding, see Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:
Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 379 ("Wherever they exist in
the world, black women braid their hair. They have done so in the United States for more than four
centuries. African in origin, the practice of braiding is as American-black American-as sweet potato
pie.,,).
11. See e.g., Braider Licensing Raises Issue of State Regulation vs. Culture, supra note 10; Gloria
Lau, A Hair-Brained Scheme, FORBES, Oct. 20, 1997, at 220 ("[S]tupid laws.., stifle the
entrepreneurial aspirations of a few thousand poor Americans.").
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stake for black women consumers in this debate? And why have officials
neglected to engage in this inquiry?
This Comment takes up both of these questions. After an overview of the
cultural, political, legal, and economic salience and evolution of black hair in
Part I and an explanation of the current regulatory scheme in Part II, Part III
argues that abolishing and modifying certification standards for natural
hairstylists warrants hesitation and policy innovation by courts and
policymakers. Though braiders raise good arguments challenging the
arbitrariness of many regulatory regimes, the health and safety risks of braiding
and other forms of natural hairstyling are non-negligible and deserve some12
acknowledgement.2 Part IV contends that the failure of well-intentioned judges
and policymakers to consider seriously the interests of black women reveals a
culturally relativist heuristic that manifests itself in cultural deference. The
operation of this heuristic in the context of the braiding cases indicates subtle
race-sex bias. 13 Finally, Part V suggests an alternative to the culturally
deferential approach to regulations. Following the path of several other states,14
state legislators should exempt braiders from cosmetology licensing
requirements and authorize state administrators to promulgate substantive
regulations that are reasonably related to braiding and natural styling.
Developing a specialized policy for braiding and natural hairstyling will
increase the likelihood that policymakers will seriously engage with braiders'
claims about black culture and consider the possibly divergent interests of
black women consumers.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BLACK WOMEN'S HAIR
As a cultural, political, legal, and economic matter, hair occupies a
significant space in black women's lives. This Part focuses on the complex role
that hair has played in the social positioning of African-American women-as
a cultural marker, a political statement, a means for economic empowerment,
but also as a political and economic liability. Section A explores the unique
space hair occupies in black women's culture. Section B turns to the political
significance of hair both historically and currently. Section C discusses black
12. It is important to note that, although I call for a more thorough inquiry into plaintiffs' claims
that natural hairstyling is a harmless cultural practice, consideration of these risks should not necessarily
lead courts or policymakers to uphold or strengthen the regulation of braiders. A court or legislature
might review data on the dangers associated with natural hair styling and still decide to exempt or curtail
braider licensing requirements.
13. 1 use "race-sex bias" as opposed to "race and sex bias" or any other wording throughout the
Comment to emphasize both the unity of sex and race bias and the primacy of race bias in these cases.
Black women consumers are disregarded not because of their race, and not because of their sex, but
because of their sex as it functions within their racial group.
14. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-20, -255 (2007); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.110 (Vernon
2007); 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 41-30-10 to -250 (2007) (establishing licensure for braiding and braiding
schools); see also Braider Licensing Raises Issue of State Regulation v. Culture, supra note 10.
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hair's interaction with legal constraints. Finally, Section D focuses on the role
black hair plays in the economic positioning of black women, particularly for
black women entrepreneurs who rely predominantly on black women
consumers. These spheres are interrelated: For example, the legal constraints on
black women's hair in the workplace impact their economic position. This
framework grounds my argument that hairbraiding-far from being a quaint
cultural artifact-is in fact part of a complex social structure that decision-
makers should consider when creating or interpreting policy.
A. Cultural Significance
The rituals of black hair grooming provide shared stories and a sense of
community among many black women.1 5 Though "[h]air seems to be such a
little thing,"'' 6 it has permeated nearly every aspect of many black women's
lives. Lanita Jacobs-Huey, a professor of anthropology at the University of
Southern California, dedicated six years of research to observing black
women's discussions about hair in everyday settings.' 7 bell hooks describes the
custom of having one's hair "pressed" (that is, straightened):
Hair pressing was a ritual of black women's culture-of intimacy. It
was an exclusive moment when black women (even those who did not
know one another well) might meet at home or in the beauty parlor to
talk with one another, to listen to the talk .... It was a world where the
images constructed as barriers between one's self and the world were
briefly let go, before they were made again.
i s
There is even a shared lexicon of black hair care that many black children learn
early on, a vocabulary that "indoctrinate[s] [them] into the intricate culture of
hair."'19 The cultural and social implications of hair for black women have also
15. Marcia Gillespie, former editor-in-chief of Ms. and Essence magazines, explains: "I think part
of the stories that bind us together as Black [people] are our hair stories." AYANA D. BYRD & LORI L.
THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF BLACK HAIR IN AMERICA 139 (2001) (alteration in
original). Michelle Burford elaborates the various connections between hair and culture:
My humiliation that night was just another episode in that series of shames, blisters and life
stories so many of us begin gathering in girlhood. For sisters, hair is much more than
insulation from cold weather .... For us, hair represents everything from politics to the
possibility of nabbing the finest brother; it remains a lightning rod of division that we
inherited from plantation owners, a caste system separating the lights from the darks, the
loosely curled from the tightly coiled. Yet no matter where we find ourselves on the color-
and-texture spectrum, hair will always be the Black girl's consummate rite of passage ....
Hair: A Love Story, ESSENCE, Feb. 2006, at 146.
16. Caldwell, supra note 10, at 370.
17. LANITA JACOBS-HUEY, FROM THE KITCHEN TO THE PARLOR: LANGUAGE AND BECOMING IN
AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN'S HAIR CARE (2006).
18. bell hooks, Straightening Our Hair, in TENDERHEADED: A COMB-BENDING COLLECTION OF
HAIR STORIES Ill (Juliette Harris & Pamela Johnson eds., 2001) [hereinafter TENDERHEADED]; see also
BELL HOOKS, BONE BLACK 91-93 (1996) (discussing the ritual of hair pressing during hooks's
childhood).
19. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 134. Byrd and Tharps continue, "Vocabulary words like
grease, kitchen (the hair at the nape of the neck, not the room in the house), and touch-up are ones a
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found an important place within black American art and literature. The novels
of Pulitzer Prize-winners Toni Morrison and Alice Walker, 21 and the works of
Maya Angelou 22 and Zora Neale Hurston, 23 are examples ofthis phenomenon.
Additionally, black women's hair has been the subject of children's books,
24
25 2627nonfiction works, movies,2 6 and music.
B. Political Significance
The political implications of black hair are as salient as its cultural
elements. 28 Negro World, the magazine of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro
Improvement Association (UNIA), was filled with polemics against hair
straightening.29 Garvey urged African Americans, "Don't remove the kinks
Black child hears at a very early age and needs to learn in order to fully participate in the Black hair
lifestyle." Id. However, they note that "[flamiliarity with the tools and fluidity in the language of Black
hair culture do not automatically qualify a person as a member of the club .... Certain rituals and rites
of passage must also be experienced." Id. at 136. Byrd and Tharps go on to provide readers with a black
hair glossary. Id. at 137-38.
20. See, e.g., TONI MORRISON, SONG OF SOLOMON 140, 340-41 (1977); TONI MORRISON, SULA
148-49 (1973); TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 62, 82 (1970); cf MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE,
supra, at 44-50 (illustrating Pecola's belief that beauty, defined as having blue eyes and blond hair,
would bring love from her teachers, schoolmates, and family).
21. See, e.g., ALICE WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE 220 (1982) (articulating the protagonist's concern
that her friend would not love her because, among other things, her hair was "short and kinky").
22. See, e.g., MAYA ANGELOU, I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS 2-3 (1969) (describing the
author's "black ugly dream" in which her hair was a "kinky mass").
23. See generally ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD (1937).
24. See, e.g., CAROLIVIA HERRON, NAPPY HAIR (1997); BELL HOOKS & CHRIS RASCHKA, HAPPY
TO BE NAPPY (2001); NATASHA ANASTASIA TARPLEY, I LOVE MY HAIR! (1998).
25. See, e.g., INGRID BANKS, HAIR MATTERS: BEAUTY, POWER, AND BLACK WOMEN'S
CONSCIOUSNESS (2000); LONNICE BRITTENUM BONNER, GOOD HAIR (1990); SHARON D. CHAPPELLE,
NAPPY JOURNEY: THE TWISTED ROAD TO NATURAL HAIR (2002); JACOBS-HUEY, supra note 17; LINDA
MOSETTA JONES, NAPPYISMS: AFFIRMATIONS FOR NAPPY-HEADED PEOPLE AND WANNABES! (2003);
NOLIWE M. ROOKS, HAIR RAISING: BEAUTY, CULTURE, AND AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN (1996).
Novelist Alice Walker has addressed the culture of black hair in some of her nonfiction writings. Alice
Walker, Dreads, in FRANCESCO MASTALIA & ALFONSE PAGANO, DREADS 8 (1999); ALICE WALKER,
Oppressed Hair Puts a Ceiling on the Brain, in LIVING BY THE WORD: SELECTED WRITINGS 1973-1987,
at 69 (1988).
26. See, e.g., B.A.P.S. (New Line Cinema 1997); BEAUTY SHOP (MGM Pictures 2005); HAIR
SHOW (UrbanWorks Entertainment 2004); NORA'S HAIR SALON (Warning Films/Nu-Lite Entertainment
2004).
27. Black musician India.Arie's 2006 single, I Am Not My Hair, earned a spot on The Billboard
Hot 100. Billboard, http://www.billboard.com/bbcom/index.jsp (follow "Charts" hyperlink, then search
"India.Arie" under "Music Search"; select "Artist" from "Music Search" menu; then follow "Artist
Chart History" hyperlink); see also INDIA.ARIE, I Am Not My Hair, on TESTIMONY: VOL. 1, LIFE &
RELATIONSHIP (Universal Motown Records 2006).
28. See Mark Higbee, The Hairdresser and the Scholar, in TENDERHEADED, supra note 18, at 11,
11-12.
29. See BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 38-39. It is important to note that, while Garvey and
Negro World condemned hair straightening, two-thirds of the magazine's advertising space contained
advertisements for hair straighteners. Instead of an indication of hypocrisy or contradiction, these
advertisements might be a result of Garvey's primary message, which was supportive of black-owned
business. Companies that sold hair straighteners were some of the most successful black-owned
businesses at the time.
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from your hair! ... Remove them from your brain!",30 Perhaps most famously,
the Black Power Movement of the 1960s and 1970s encouraged African-
American men and women to forsake straightened locks for large afros. The
negative perceptions of straightened hair were so strong during this era that
some who could not achieve a good afro style used chemical processes to
achieve the look.31 Political dissident Angela Davis, a prominent figure in the
Black Panther Party, became just as famous for her large afro as for her
activism. 32 The politics of hair has declined since the popularity of afros was at
its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s. 33 But still, as recently as the spring of 2006, a
black woman's hair was a focal point in the halls of predominantly white and
male Congress. Former Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney's hair attracted a
great deal of attention in the spring of 2006 after her altercation with a Capitol
Hill police officer who did not recognize her and barred her from entering the
Capitol building. Some claimed that part of the reason officers did not
recognize her was her new "twistout" hairstyle. 34 Talk radio host Neal Boortz
had this to say about Congresswoman McKinney: "I don't blame that cop for
stopping her. It looked like a welfare drag queen was trying to sneak into the
Longworth House Office Building. That hairdo is ghetto trash. 35 Though
McKinney may not have intended for her hair to make a political statement,
and though her response to being turned away was unhelpful (to say the least),
public reaction sent a message that black women in political office are
essentially one hairstyle away from being told they do not belong there.
36
30. Id. at 38. See also Tracey Owens Patton, Hey Girl, Am I More than My Hair?: African
American Women and Their Struggles with Beauty, Body Image, and Hair, NWSA J., Summer 2006, at
29, available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nwsa-joumal/vO18/18.2patton.pdf.
31. See, e.g., BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 59.
32. Angela Y. Davis, Afro Images: Politics, Fashion and Nostalgia, in TENDERHEADED, supra note
18, at 200.
33. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 63-64.
34. See, e.g., Robin Givhan, Why a Hairstyle Made Headlines, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2006, at C01;
Jabari Asim, Posting of 12:30 EST, Washington Post Blog, Apr. 10, 2006, to
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2006/04/1 0/BL200604 1 000578-pf.html. Creative
Loafing Atlanta, a recreation-focused newspaper in the capital of McKinney's state, also discussed the
Congresswoman's hair. Two out of the three people interviewed for the paper's "Streetalk" section
suggested that she straighten her hair and highlight it or add extensions to it-recommendations that
bring to light deeply-rooted political issues about black hair, "good hair," and professionalism. Jeff
Slate, Should Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney Consider a New Hair Stylist?, CREATIVE LOAFING,
Apr. 5, 2006, http://atlanta.creativeloafing.com/gyrobase/Content? oid=oid%3A57600.
35. Boortz Claimed McKinney "Looked Like a Welfare Drag Queen "; Predicted "Media Matters
Will Pick Up on That," Media Matters (Mar. 31, 2006), http://mediamatters.org/items/200604010003
(transcribing portion of The Neal Boortz Show that aired on Mar. 31, 2006).
36. It is important to note that hair was not the only factor in this incident: McKinney was not
wearing the lapel pin that should have identified her as a member of Congress. Asim, supra note 34.
Still, McKinney's hair garnered an inordinate amount of attention.
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C. Legal Significance
Hair has had a substantial impact on the legal status of black women and
children. For example, in 1972 the National Association of Black Social
Workers (NABSW) cited white parents' need to be taught hairstyling
techniques that come "naturally" to black parents as one of many reasons to
prohibit transracial adoption.37 While it is highly unlikely that the NABSW's
stance entirely explains the commonness of race-matching through the early
1990s, many adoption agencies used the policy until Congress passed the
Howard Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) in 1994, which
barred adoption agencies and similar organizations receiving federal funds
from using race as the sole placement factor. 38 As recently as 1999, NABSW
continued to use hair as one rationale for its stance against transracial
adoption,39 taking the odd position that it is better for black children to spend a
longer time in foster care or institutions than to live permanently with white
families that do not "naturally" understand their hair, and by analogy, their
culture. Because boys' hair is often closely cropped, most of the hair
difficulties associated with transracial adoption are more salient when families
seek to adopt black girls.4 °
Most notably, however, black hair has had considerable effects on the legal
status of black women's economic position. The oft-studied case Rogers v.
American Airlines41 illustrates the legal limitations on black women's hair (or
rather, the blackness of women's hair). In that case, Renee Rogers, a black
37. National Association of Black Social Workers, Position Statement on Trans-Racial Adoption
(Sept. 1972), available at http://uoregon.edu/-adoption/archive/NabswTRA.htm. See also Ezra E.H.
Griffith & Rachel L. Bergeron, Cultural Stereotypes Die Hard: The Case of Transracial Adoption, 34 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 303, 305 (2006).
38. Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat.
4056 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1996b (2000)). For more information on race-matching in
adoption, see R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences
Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998); Elizabeth Bartholet, Cultural
Stereotypes Can and Do Die: It's Time to Move on with Transracial Adoption, 34 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 315 (2006). See also Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The
Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, 1183-85 (1991) (discussing the
pervasive but hidden nature of race-matching policies in both public and private adoption agencies prior
to the passage of MEPA).
39. Rudolph C. Smith, president of NABSW, told a Denver reporter:
In a nutshell, African-Americans are in the best position to teach African-American children
how to survive in this country as African Americans .... White females can't teach young
black girls how to comb their hair; white men can't teach young black boys what to do on the
street when the cops stop you, so you don't get yourself shot or killed .... Those things are
not experienced in Caucasian communities.
Janet Simons, Love is Color Blind: Dad Shares Secrets to Raising Biracial Children, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Feb. 7, 1999, at 13F. See BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 163.
40. See Adoption: A Family Choice, African American Childrens' [sic] Hair & Skin Care: Pat's
Suggestions, http://www.adoptn.org/hair.html#Pat ("Hair care (unless it's a boy with a close-cropped
head) is going to be a big issue .... "); see also Adoption: A Family Choice, Hair and Self-Esteem,
http://www.adoptn.org/hair.html#hair5 (last visited Apr. 13, 2007); Adoption: A Family Choice, Short
Hair or Long Hair?, http://www.adoptn.org/hair.html#hair9 (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
41. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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female employee of American Airlines, was fired because she refused to
remove or cover her cornrow braids. Rogers claimed that American Airlines'
policy was discriminatory on the basis of race and sex insofar as it barred
wearing a traditional hairstyle of black women. The court insisted on treating
Rogers's claims as separate race discrimination and sex discrimination claims,
42ultimately denying both.
Real or perceived hostility to black hair in a variety of workplaces persists.
The Baltimore City Police Department, which polices a city that is over sixty-
five percent black,4 3 recently barred its officers from wearing various natural
hairstyles, effectively limiting black women officers to straightening or cutting
off their hair.44 The author of an online petition against the policy has reported
that it was rescinded,45 but there have been no news reports to that effect. Vault
Guide to Conquering Corporate America for Women and Minorities advises
that black women "[t]ry not to make [their] hair too memorable .... African-
American women can wear neat braids or short natural styles; elaborate colored
extensions and unruly dreads should be avoided., 46 Because restrictions on
traditionally black hairstyles in the workplace disproportionately affect black
women, the denial of protected legal status makes hair a liability for black
women's employment.
D. Significance to Entrepreneurship
Though possessing black hair has often proved difficult in predominantly
white workplaces, the hair care industry has long been one of the few sites of
success for black women entrepreneurs. Not including the cosmetology
industry, the creation and distribution of ethnic hair products purportedly
generates eight billion dollars of revenue annually.47 Madam C.J. Walker, one
42. For a fuller treatment of the Rogers case, see, for example, KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 131-38
(2006); Caldwell, supra note 10, at 376-80; John M. Kang, Deconstructing the Ideology of White
Aesthetics, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 283, 312-17 (1997); Michelle L. Turner, The Braided Uproar: A
Defense of My Sister's Hair and a Contemporary Indictment of Rogers v. American Airlines, 7
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 136-40 (2001); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race
Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 379 (2006).
43. U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 American Community Survey, Baltimore City, Maryland,
http://factfinder.census.gov (enter "Baltimore" and select "Maryland" under "Fast Access to
Information," press "Go," then click on "Baltimore city, Maryland" under "Cities and Towns") (last
visited Apr. 13, 2007).
44. Police Appearance Policy Raises Racial Sensitivity Issues, WBAL TV II (Dec. 5, 2006),
http://www.wbaltv.com/l I investigates/I 0470167/detail.html.
45. Baltimore Police Dept. Racist Grooming Policy Petition, http://www.petitiononline.com/
baltpd/petition.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
46. PATRICIA KAO ET AL., VAULT GUIDE TO CONQUERING CORPORATE AMERICA FOR WOMEN AND
MINORITIES 13 (2003).
47. Black Owned Beauty Supply Association (BOBSA), About BOBSA: Our Mission,
http://www.bobsa.org/index.php?option=com content&task=category&sectionid=4&id=4&ltemid=51
(last visited Apr. 13, 2007). The hair care market is split into "general" and "ethnic" categories.
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of the first black female self-made millionaires, achieved her wealth through a
hair straightening empire in the early twentieth century.48 Her contemporary,
Annie Tumbo Malone, also became a wealthy woman and noted philanthropist
as a result of her "Poro" hair system.
49
A cottage industry has also developed for hair products specially designed
for natural hair. While men of all races ran the early, corporate-controlled
market for "natural" products, 50 black women are gradually taking control of
that market.51 Natural hairstyling is a relative newcomer to the lucrative
industry. The 1990s brought greater interest in "afrocentrism," which was a
boon for African immigrant hair braiders and importers of human hair (which is
used to create many popular braided styles.)52 With the growing popularity of
dreadlocks and the resurgence of some afro styles, natural hairstyling has
become a force to be reckoned with inside the larger black hair industry.
53
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MODERN BRAIDING INDUSTRY
The braiding practices of yesteryear, honed on stoops and in kitchens,
sharply contrast with those of today's professional natural hair salons. The
evolution of braiding has led state administrators to apply cosmetology
regulations to braiders and natural hair stylists, sparking their intense
opposition. This Part fleshes out that development. Section A discusses the
current braiding and natural hair industry, highlighting its evolution from a
home craft to a commercial endeavor and describing the current regulatory
environment. The goal of Section A is to show that braiders' quaint, home-
Chemene R. Quinn, Timothy M. Quinn & A. Paul Kelly, Hair Care Practices in African American
Women, 72 HIGHLIGHTING SKIN OF COLOR 280, 280 (2003).
48. Derek T. Dingle, Madame C. Walker: Breaking New Ground, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Feb. 2005,
at 20, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m l365/is_7_35/ai_n9485614.
49. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 31-32.
50. Id. at 93-94.
51. One of the most prominent black women in the natural hair product market today is Lisa Price,
the President and CEO of Carol's Daughter, a natural product line that boasts multimillion-dollar annual
revenues and multiple celebrity investors. See Will Smith, Jay-Z Back Beauty Line, CNN.COM, May 18,
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/18/news/newsmakers/cosmetics/. Other black women have begun
similar home-prepared product lines. See, e.g., Anita Grant, https://anitagrant.com/ (last visited on Feb.
27, 2006); Karen's Body Beautiful, http://www.karensbodybeautiful.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2007);
Oyin Handmade, http://oyinhandmade.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2007); Qhemet Biologics,
http://www.qhemet biologics.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). In addition to hair products, all of these
companies sell products for the body, the home, and for other purposes.
52. BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 93, 95. See also Pamela Reynolds, Homespun Hair; Kitchen
Salons Surge in Popularity as Black Women Seek Out Natural Look, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1995, at
71.
53. In fact, some braiders claim that one reason for the crackdown on unlicensed braiders is
because black cosmetologists who specialized in chemical treatments began to feel threatened by
braiders' encroachment upon their business. Gloria Lau, supra note 11, at 220 ("Licensed beauty salon
staffers generate several billion dollars annually from straightening hair with chemicals. That's a nice
business. Who wants a bunch of hair braiders cutting in on a good thing like that?"); Paghdiwala, supra
note 1.
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based depiction of the industry is partially outdated. Section B will briefly
summarize some of the challenges to braiding regulations, indicating a trend in
the direction of deregulation.
A. The Increasing Professionalism of Braiding and its Costs
Relative to other black-led industries, braiding is big business. Dwana
Makeba, an English professor and a licensed cosmetologist, acknowledged the
shift from braiding-as-home-craft to braiding-as-industry: "Nowadays, the art is
being passed on commercially (rather) than passed on from families." 54 Many
braider advocates continue to focus on braiding as a homegrown craft, although
this narrative is partially mythical, or at least outdated. The evolution of the
braiding industry has, understandably, changed the government's relationship
to the industry.
Industry leaders have facilitated a movement toward professionalization of
the braiding industry by leading seminars and workshops,
55 producing videos, 56
and creating a trade literature 57 that introduces their techniques to a large
audience. The costs of these videos and workshops are high enough that one
surmises they are not intended for the casual braider who wants to learn to do
her own hair: They have the purpose of "shor[ing] up the presumed boundaries
between hair novices and hair experts. ' ' 58 For example, Taliah Waajid, an
Atlanta entrepreneur, charges $500 per session for her workshops, 59 and
JoAnne Cornwell, founder of Sisterlocks, charges $1395 for a four-day training
session. Furthermore, while many braiders operate from their homes, many
others have moved to salons.61 Modem natural hair salons like Khamit Kinks in
New York City, Natural Hair Center in Atlanta, and Amazon Natural Look
54. Elizabeth Ashby, Black Hair in America- "HairStories'" Explores a Long Tradition,
LOUISIANA WKLY., Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.louisianaweekly.com/weekly/news/articlegate.pl?
20050404h.
55. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
56. Stylists sometimes sell instructional videos on their websites. See, e.g., Royalty Braiding
Videos, http://www.royaltybraids.com/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2007); Taliah Waajid Natural Hair Center,
Educational Videos, http://www.naturalhair.org/index.aspPageAction= VIEWCATS&Category=5 (last
visited Apr. 15, 2007). At least one entrepreneur sells an electronic instruction book for starting a
braiding business. See Braids by Breslin, New Book Teaches You How To Make Money Braiding and
Weaving Hair, http://www.braidsbybreslin.com/book.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
57. Trade magazines include Braids & Beauty, Black Beauty Braids Magazine, Elite Hair Braids
Magazine, and Braids World.
58. JACOBS-HUEY, supra note 17, at 29.
59. Taliah Waajid Natural Hair Center, Seminars & Events, http://www.naturalhair.org/index.asp?
PageAction
= 
Custom&ID=4 (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
60. Sisterlocks, Consultant Training Program, http://www.sisterlocks.com/Training__Classes/
Traininginfo.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
61. Should Hairbraiders Be Licensed?, JET, Oct. 27, 1997, at 54 ("The hairbraiding business has
grown into such a lucrative enterprise that many hairbraiders have stopped braiding hair in their homes
and have opened salons.").
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Salon in Chicago provide a wide range of services and claim high levels of
expertise.
62
The states have responded differently to these developments. Eleven states
overtly and completely exempt braiders from licensing requirements. 63 At the
opposite end of the spectrum, seven states expressly identify braiders as
cosmetologists. 64 Ten states have taken the approach this Comment supports by
creating specialized licenses for braiders. 65 In twenty-two states, including
states with relatively large black populations like Alabama, Massachusetts, and
New Jersey, the law is silent on the issue. 66 There is not a discernable regional
pattern of braiding regulation. Until recent years, the legal status of braiders
and natural hair stylists was ambiguous: They were not overtly exempted from
cosmetology laws, but they were not compelled to abide by them either. 67 As
braiding and natural styling became more popular and as natural salons began
offering more services, it is not surprising that they eventually began to attract
unwanted attention from state regulators.
The indiscriminate application of cosmetology licensing requirements to
braiders is likely a product of cosmetologists' desire to eliminate competition
from braiders rather than a benevolent consumer protection effort.68 As braids
and natural styles increase in popularity, cosmetologists' business is
compromised. Cosmetologists believe that it is unfair that they must go through
a long and expensive licensing process while braiders, whose work is certainly
not risk-free, can avoid licensing altogether. 69 Since cosmetology boards are
composed mostly of salon owners, 70 it is not surprising that boards would try to
limit unlicensed competitors.
62. The Khamit Kinks website refers to the salon as a "pioneer in natural hair care" and touts its
"award winning work and national exposure." Khamit Kinks Website, http://www.khamitkinks.com/
Home.html. Waajid's Natural Hair Center's website proclaims, "Welcome to the Home of Natural Hair
Care." Braids, Weaves, & Things Webpage, http://www.naturalhair.org/index.asp (last visited Apr. 15,
2007).
63. VALERIE BAYHAM, A DREAM DEFERRED: LEGAL BARRIERS TO AFRICAN HAIRBRAIDING
NATIONWIDE (2006), available at http://ij.org/publications/other/national-hairbraiding.html. For a
graphical depiction of national braiding regulations, see Institute for Justice, Hairbraiding Laws,
http://www.ij.org/pdf folder/economic-liberty/national-hairbraiding/hairbraidinglaws05mapnew.pdf.
These states include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Washington. Id.
64. BAYHAM, supra note 63.
65. Those states are Florida, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Id. See infra Part V.
66. BAYHAM, supra note 63.
67. See Paghdiwala, supra note 1.
68. Id.
69. South Carolina Board of Cosmetology, Minutes of Sept. 9, 2002 Meeting, available at
http://www.llr.state.sc.us/POL/COSMETOLOGY/formsMinutes/cosminl5.pdf. See also infra note 68
and accompanying text.
70. John Stossel, Trimming the Bureaucrats, N.Y. SUN, Apr. 6, 2005, at 9.
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B. Modern-Day Abolitionists?: Braiders'Responses to State Crackdowns
When state officials began to enforce cosmetology laws by sending
undercover police to operate "hair stings" 71 of braid shops, some braiders
reacted by seeking judicial intervention. This Section relates just a few of the
instances when braiders have challenged regulations to lay a foundation for this
Comment's critique of the outcomes' rationales and ramifications.
1. Washington, D.C.: Uqdah v. District of Columbia
72
In 1980, Taalib-Din Uqdah and his wife, Pamela Ferrell, started Cornrows
& Co., a noted natural hair salon in Washington, D.C. 73 In 1989, government
officials went to Uqdah's place of business to notify him that he was operating
in violation of D.C. law, which required all cosmetologists to be licensed.
Uqdah had not been aware of the law, but promised to obey it. Upon learning
that D.C. law, as amended in 1938, required cosmetologists to receive 1500
hours of expensive training, Uqdah and Ferrell decided to continue braiding
without licenses despite the law. After D.C. officials returned to Cornrows &
Co., this time imposing a one thousand dollar fine, Uqdah decided to bring suit
against the District to seek exemption from the licensing requirement.
74
Uqdah claimed that the licensing requirement violated his rights to due
process and equal protection. He argued that his loss of "economic liberty" and
subjection to arbitrary licensing requirements violated his right to substantive
due process. He also claimed that the regulations did not provide an equal
opportunity for braiders to serve the public.75 The D.C. District Court granted
summary judgment to the defendant District and dismissed Uqdah's case with
prejudice. The court quickly dispatched both legal claims on the grounds that
braiding fit the definition of cosmetology as laid out in the law and, relying on
Ferguson v. Skrupa,76 contended that the state does not have to show that each
licensing requirement is relevant for each person it regulates. But the court had
great sympathy for Uqdah's policy arguments, strongly urging the D.C. City
71. See South Carolina Board of Cosmetology Minutes, supra note 69; Lee Hubbard, Hair-Brained
Politics, SALON, Sept. 13, 1999; Stephen Humphries, The State vs. Hair Braiders, CHRISTIAN SCI.-
MONITOR, Mar. 15, 2000, at 17.
72. 785 F. Supp. 1015 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated, 995 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (unpublished
disposition).
73. Comrows & Co., Company, http://www.comrowsandco.com/company.cfm?companylD=l (last
visited Feb. 27, 2007).
74. Hoover Institute, City Hall's License to Kill Civil Society, POL'Y REV. (July-Aug. 1996),
available at http://www.hoover.org/ publications/policyreview/3574767.html; Institute for Justice,
Litigation Backgrounder: Uqdah v. Board of Cosmetology, http://www.ij.org/economic-
liberty/dc.hairbraiding/backgrounder.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
75. Uqdah, 785 F. Supp. at 1018.
76. 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding a Kansas law requiring that debt adjusters be licensed
attorneys).
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Council to reconsider the issue: "Certainly the D.C. Council can exercise sound
judgment and common sense to accommodate Plaintiffs' needs.., the Court
would certainly urge the District to consider the plight of Plaintiffs and the
good citizens they have faithfully served for over twelve years." 77 The D.C.
City Council eventually did so, amending the cosmetology law.71 Uqdah then
founded the American Hairbraiders & Natural Haircare Association (AHNHA)
as an advocacy organization for African hair braiders and natural stylists.
79
2. California: Cornwell v. Hamilton
80
JoAnne Cornwell is an associate professor of French and Africana Studies
at San Diego State University, but starting in 1993, she also became a natural
hair entrepreneur. Cornwell started the company Sisterlocks, which markets a
system of black natural hair care that creates miniscule dreadlocks. Cornwell's
company has three divisions: hair services, training, and products and
accessories.81 Sisterlocks has highly regimented training, certification, and
administration requirements, even specifying the number and content of salon
visits included in "the Sisterlocks Package." 82 The website lists all official
trainees.
8 3
In 1997, Cornwell decided to challenge California's cosmetology licensing
system as applied to braiders. Unlike Uqdah's case, Cornwell's suit was not
sparked by run-ins with state officials, although other unlicensed stylists in
California had been reprimanded. 4  Cornwell, like Uqdah, brought
constitutional due process and equal protection claims. The court, applying
rational basis review, held that although California's professed interest in the
health and safety of its citizens was legitimate, its regulations were irrational as
applied to braiders. However, the court did not strike down cosmetology
77. Uqdah, 785 F. Supp. at 1020 n.4.
78. See D.C. CODE § 47-2853.06(c) (2005); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 17, § 3702.](c)(1) (2005); D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 17, § 3703.9 (2005); 50 D.C. Reg. 7699 (Sept. 12, 2003).
79. Cornrows & Co., About AHNHA, http://www.comrowsandco.com/politicsSub.cfn?politics
ID=I (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
80. 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
81. Sisterlocks, About Sisterlocks, http://www.sisterlocks.com/AboutSisterlocks.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2007).
82. Sisterlocks, Official Trainee Registry, http://www.sisterlocks.com/Web-Registries/Official
TraineeRegistry.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
83. Id. There are certified Sisterlocks consultants in thirty-three states, the District of Columbia,
and in several European and Caribbean nations.
84. See Hubbard, supra note 71.
85. Cornwell's equal protection argument was based on the premise that "sometimes the grossest
discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike." Cornwell v.
Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1103 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442
(1971)). It is unclear whether Uqdah made the same claim.
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requirements as applied to all braiders, just Cornwell.8 6 In 1999, the California
Legislature amended the law to exclude natural hair braiders from the
definition of barbers and cosmetologists.
8 7
3. Mississippi: Armstrong v. Lunsford
Melony Armstrong has been a licensed "wigologist" in Mississippi for over
ten years. When Armstrong learned that she would need a license to braid, she
decided to seek a wigology license that would allow her to braid with hair
extensions and weave after only 300 hours of instruction, instead of a more
comprehensive cosmetology license. Now Armstrong is a successful braider
and has begun offering classes for prospective braiders. Eventually, two
students wanted to use her wigology classes to fulfill Mississippi's licensing
requirements, but, in order to do so, Armstrong would have needed to become
certified as a cosmetology instructor. That certification would require between
2000 and 2750 hours of training in addition to the 1200 hours required to
receive a cosmetology license. 8 In 2004, Armstrong and her prospective
wigology students filed a federal suit challenging not only the cosmetology
instructor licensing requirements, but also the cosmetology and wigology
requirements as applied to braiders.89 In 2005, the Mississippi Legislature
passed and Governor Haley Barbour signed an amendment to state law defining
hair braiding and exempting braiders from the cosmetology, wigology, and
cosmetology instruction laws, thereby mooting Armstrong's case. 90 Currently,
the state only requires braiders to pay a twenty-five dollar registration fee and
to take a self-test from a brochure on sanitation.
91
In addition to states that have amended their laws as a result of legal
challenges, some states, such as South Carolina, Georgia, Texas, and Virginia
changed their laws without a suit. A few states, like Missouri, continue to insist
on putting braiding in the same category as chemical processing, but these
states are bucking the trend. The braiding cases have created a unique niche for
braiders and natural hair stylists in the regulatory regime. Though they perform
many tasks associated with the highly-regulated cosmetology industry, they are
exempt from occupational licensing requirements. This trend reflects a policy
86. The court did not draw the same conclusion about the other named plaintiff, Uqdah's American
Hairbraiders & Natural Haircare Association, because it was unsure of what services member braiders
performed. Id. at 1108.
87. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7316(d)(2) (West 2007).
88. Institute for Justice, Challenging Barriers to Economic Justice: Untangling African
Hairbraiders from Mississippi's Cosmetology Regime, http://www.ij.org/economicliberty/ms.
hairbraiding/backgrounder.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
89. Id.
90. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 73-7-31(d), -71 (2006); H.B. 454, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005),
available at http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/2005/html/history/hb /hb0454.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
91. MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-7-71(2)-(3) (2006).
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strategy that has not fully considered the costs and benefits of regulation for
both braiders and braid-wearers.
III. WHAT'S AT STAKE: HARM AND ARBITRARINESS IN THE REGULATION OF
BLACK HAIR
This Part addresses the first question posed in the Introduction: What is at
stake for black women in the braiding debate? Section A critiques the assertion
by deregulation advocates that braiding and natural hairstyling are "harmless."
I argue that this is a mischaracterization because of the notable connection
between hair loss and braiding. Section B addresses braiders' claim that current
regulations are arbitrary. Though I disagree with their portrayal of braiding
risks, I concur with their arbitrariness point. These determinations lay the
foundation for this Comment's suggestion of a middle-of-the-road, specialized
regulatory regime.
A. Black Women Consumers: Braiding as a "Harmless" Practice
Advocates of natural hairstyling deregulation, in addition to noting the
cultural significance of the practice, frequently assert that braiding and natural
hairstyling are essentially harmless because they do not employ heat or harsh
chemicals. 92 This Section calls into question the claim that natural hairstyling is
"harmless." While hairbraiding and natural hairstyling are undoubtedly safer
than pressing93 or relaxing,94 they still present non-negligible risks to black
women. These risks are significant enough to warrant the consideration of
policymakers and courts as they consider braiding regulations.
Courts and legislatures have seriously acknowledged only one risk for
braid-wearers: infectious scalp disease. 95 Some states that have largely
deregulated the braiding industry have retained requirements that braiders
receive a brochure or take a very short course on sanitation and recognizing
92. See, e.g., Zanders, supra note 10 ("There are no health and safety justifications because there
are no health concerns-they braid, weave and lock hair using their hands.") (quoting Lee McGrath,
executive director of IJ's Minnesota chapter); id. ("'They say it's a health and safety issue, but we use
natural products-a comb and hair grease."') (quoting Salahud-Din Shabazz, a Minnesota "hair artist").
93. "Pressing" is a process in which a metal comb is heated to an extremely high temperature and
combed through curly hair to temporarily straighten it. Keratin, Curling Irons and Heated Rollers,
http://www.keratin.com/ai/ai028.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
94. "Relaxing" is a chemical process in which an alkaline mixture is applied to the hair to
permanently straighten it. The alkaline base may contain calcium, lithium, or sodium hydroxide. D.A.
Rauch, Hair Relaxer Misuse: Don't Relax, 105 PEDIATRICS 1154, 1154 (2000).
95. One example of a scalp disease highly associated with braiding is tinea capitis, or scalp
ringworm. Tinea capitis is a contagious disease frequently observed in black schoolchildren. Aditya K.
Gupta et al., Tinea Capitis: An Overview with Emphasis on Management, 16 PEDIATRIC DERMATOLOGY
171 (1999); Amit G. Pandya, Seborrheic Dermatitis or Tinea Capitis: Don't Be Fooled, 37 INT'L J.
DERMATOLOGY 827 (1998); Judith V. Williams et al., Semiquantitative Study on Tinea Capitis and the
Asymptomatic Carrier State in Inner-City School Children, 96 PEDIATRICS 265 (1995).
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scalp infections. 96 Other risks, however, have received no judicial or legislative
attention. One of those risks is alopecia, another term for abnormal hair loss or
baldness. Because tight braids and chemical straightening processes are major
causes of alopecia, black women are especially subject to it.97 Alopecia comes
in many forms, but the most prevalent one for braid-wearers and people with
long dreadlocks is traction alopecia, a disorder that can result in permanent hair
loss. 9 8 Central centrifugal cicatricial alopecia is another form of the disease
caused by poor styling techniques. 99 Cosmetology regulations sometimes
acknowledge alopecia risks briefly, but court documents and newspaper articles
on the controversy over braider licensing often leave them out altogether, even
though literature directed toward black women has warned of the disease. 100 In
addition to scalp diseases and hair loss, there are other more acute risks of
braiding. Braiders usually use matches, lighters, candles, boiling hot water, and
other devices to seal and smoothly finish their creations. An untrained,
unlicensed braider could misuse these dangerous items, thereby presenting a
serious risk to clients.
10 1
96. Mississippi, for example, passed a bill in 2005 that requires braiders to pay a twenty-five dollar
fee, take a self-test, and receive a brochure about sanitation. Mississippi Eases Hair Braiding Rules,
Assoc. PRESS, Mar. 29, 2005, available at http://www.blackamericaweb.com/site.aspx/
headlines/braiding330.
97. Valerie D. Callender et al., Medical and Surgical Therapies for Alopecias in Black Women, 17
DERMATOLOGIC THERAPY 164 (2004); R.M. Earles, Surgical Correction of Traumatic Alopecia
Marginalis or Traction Alopecia in Black Women, 12 J. DERMATOLOGIC SURGERY & ONCOLOGY 78
(1986); Suzanne 0. Niang et al., Alopecia in Senegalese Women, 44 INT'L J. DERMATOLOGY 22 (2005).
The propensity of black women to suffer from alopecia is ironic considering the energy and expense
associated with black women's hair care. Even if hair loss seems to be an unimportant factor to decision-
makers in the braiding cases, the salience of hair to black women might actually be one reason to err
toward over-valuing the risks of braiding.
98. Callender, supra note 97; see Susan Taylor, Society Hill Dermatology, The Uniqueness of
Black Hair: Dr. Susan Taylor's Prescription for Healthy Hair, http://www.societyhilldermatology.com/
feat-unique.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2007) (recognizing alopecia as one of the most frequent causes of
black women's hair problems). Surgery is sometimes an option for blacks suffering from alopecia, but,
because black skin is at high risk for abnormal scarring (e.g., keloid scars), many dermatologists are
hesitant to resort to it. Callendar, supra note 97; Earles, supra note 97; Cheryl Guttman, Alopecia Option
for Black Women: Hair Transplantation Plays Emerging Role, DERMATOLOGY TIMES, May 1, 2003,
http://www.dermatologytimes.com/dermatologytimes/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=56489.
99. Holly Carter, Saving Our Strands, ESSENCE, July 2006, at 31.
100. See, e.g., id. at 6 ("Hair loss among Black women has reached near epidemic proportions ....
Many Black women suffer from what doctors call traction alopecia. Tight hairstyles-braids, weaves,
ponytails and comrows-wom over long periods of time pull on the hair, causing the natural hairline to
recede."); Zondra Hughes, The Explosion of Braids, 'Locks & Twists, EBONY, Sept. 2002, at 108; NIA,
Hair Braiders: To License or Not to License?, http://www.niaonline.com/NiaLD/NewDesign/
homepage-channel/homepage-article-fullstory/l,2015,2972,00.html (quoting Diane Bailey, owner of
Tendrils Hair Spa). Some newspaper articles on the braiding controversy make note of alopecia risks.
See, e.g., Braider Licensing Raises Issue of State Regulation vs. Culture, supra note 10 (noting one
braider's opinion that licensing "will help ensure that braiders know more about sanitation and the
various related medical conditions such as alopecia, a scalp problem caused by braiding too tight" and
acknowledging that supporters of regulation believe "there can be serious problems if people are not
properly trained how to braid .... Braiding too tight can cause [hair] to fall out").
101. Of course, a trained and licensed braider could also make -hese mistakes, but training
requirements ensure that the state has fulfilled its obligation insofar as it has used its power to protect
black women clients as much as possible. The Cornwell court took note of the dangers in the use of
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There is widespread acknowledgement among black women that wearing
braids poses some risk, and the literature seems to presume that customers have
the burden of foreseeing the hazards and taking measures to protect themselves.
But should they bear that burden? Perhaps many black women are willing to
bear these health risks to keep prices as low as possible. 102 However, placing
the burden on black customers to protect themselves is problematic for a
number of reasons. First, some professional braiders are prone to braiding
tightly, despite the association of tight braiding with hair loss, because it
pleases customers in the short-run and makes them more likely to return.103
Second, braids are a considerable investment, thereby making women less
likely to take them out if they are too tight or if the extensions are too heavy.
Small braids can cost anywhere from $100 to over $600.104 Third, black women
might be accustomed to associating pain with nice-looking hair because of
bums from chemical relaxers and pressing combs. Women who are used to
dealing with those problems might be more likely to underrate the
consequences of a tension headache or scalp tightness from braids. Fourth,
despite the availability of literature warning about the risks of tight braids,
many black women alopecia sufferers still tend to associate scalp disease with
genetics or "bad hair" instead of styling trauma. 105 Fifth, an ex post tort remedy
cigarette lighters for sealing braids, but apparently accepted the view that since braiders singe the tips of
synthetic fibers and not the actual hair, the practice was not of concern. Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F.
Supp. 2d 1101, 1108 n.21 (S.D. Cal. 1999). This distinction is untenable given that the synthetic fibers
are woven in with the client's hair.
102. Curtrise Garner, Knotty Problems: Tangled Questions Surround the Licensing of Hair
Braiders, DETROIT METRO TIMES, May 10, 2000, http://www.metrotimes.com/20/32/Features
newKnotty.htm. Alternately, prices and thus profit margins, for braiders could go down even in a system
of regulation due to the development of a black market for braids. One of the complaints about licensing
requirements in Illinois is that unlicensed braiders are practicing illegally in their homes and driving
down the market price for braids, thus lowering profit margins for storefront braiders. Paghdiwala, supra
note I.
103. One Illinois braider who emigrated from Senegal explained customers' preference for African
braiders over African-American braiders this way: "We take eight, ten hours, to do it neat and tight."
Paghdiwala, supra note I. One wonders if the tightness these customers prefer is in the best interests of
their long-term hair health. Instead of arranging the hair more loosely, some braiders advise clients to
take aspirin for tension headaches, steam their hair in order to slightly loosen it without ruining the style
(a bad move, because the steam actually makes the hair more subject to breakage), or pat it until it feels
better. Noting the commonness of this problem, Marquetta Breslin, a licensed hair braider and founder
of braiding instructional company Braids by Breslin, warns, "[Some braiders] may get caught up in
making the braids look neat rather than protecting the client[']s hair." Marquetta A. Breslin, Braids by
Breslin Blog, Posting of 16:51 EST, July 27, 2006, http://www.braidsbybreslin.com/blogger/braids-and-
tension.
104. A website called "Low-Cost African Hair Braiding" lists the starting price for micro braids
(the smallest braids) as $125. Low-Cost African Hair Braiding, http://coolbraids.blogspot.com/ (last
visited Apr. 13, 2007). Higher-end establishments charge much more: For example, Khamit Kinks in
New York City lists the cost for micro braids as $650 and up. Prices, Khamit Kinks,
http://www.khamitkinks.com/Prices.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
105. Dermatologist Chemene R. Quinn discovered in her study of twenty-three black women with
undiagnosed scalp diseases that many of her research subjects believed their problems were genetic.
Betsy Bates, Hidden Hair Disorders Common in Black Women: Uncover Cultural Burden, SKIN &
ALLERGY NEWS, Nov. 1, 2003, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.con/coms2/summary-0286-
2852615_ITM.
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for the effects of too-tight braiding over a course of years is infeasible. If an
unknowing braider does major damage to even several clients' hair over the
course of decades and provokes a lawsuit, plaintiffs would be unlikely to
sufficiently recover after attorneys' fees.' 0 6 Even if courts could somehow
assign a monetary value to hair loss of this kind, the high transaction costs of
litigation would deter consumers from pursuing legal action.' ° 7 In any event, a
working-class or even middle-class braider would be unlikely to have enough
money to cover the expense of a sufficient damages award. In other words,
braiders are judgment-proof. Consequently, an ex ante requirement that
braiders know the risks associated with their craft is more likely to protect
customers. For all of these reasons, braiders, not clients, are in the best position
to avoid costly and emotionally-traumatic accidents.1
08
B. Black Women Entrepreneurs: Braiding Regulations as Arbitrary Barriers to
Economic Independence
In addition to the culture-based arguments that challenge braiding
regulations as a concept, braiders have also argued that the regulations as
established in various states are arbitrary. They have complained that state
regulations require natural hairstylists to pay thousands of dollars for
instruction in chemical hair processes that they will never use in practice, while
offering little or no instruction in natural styling. Their arguments are
compelling: Prior to the consent decree in Anderson v. Minnesota Board of
Barber and Cosmetologist Examiners,109 braiders in Minnesota were required
to fulfill 1550 hours of training in shampooing, conditioning, hair design and
106. Even in cases where a corporation, not just an individual hairstylist, has done major damage to
black women's hair, plaintiffs may not sufficiently recover. See Laura Sullivan, A Rio Crime, in
TENDERHEADED, supra note 18, at 116, 124 (noting that black women awarded $4.5 million in a
settlement with hair product manufacturer World Rio Corporation received very little money after legal
fees were paid). For more information about the Rio scandal, see In re Rio Hair Naturalizer Prods. Liab.
Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20440 (D. Mich. 1996) (approving the settlement agreement); Black
Women Awarded $4.5 Million in Hair Care Suit, JET, Jan. 20, 1997, at 12 (providing more information
on the procedural background of the Rio settlement); cf Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of
Justice Through National Punitive Damage Reform, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1573 (1997) (showing the
discriminatory elements in the application of punitive damages in cases involving women and
minorities).
107. This is especially true when we consider that minorities and women have traditionally been
less likely to file lawsuits. Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of
Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 463, 498-500
(1996).
108. The idea of identifying which entity is best positioned to avoid the costs of tortious actions is
most famously expressed by Guido Calabresi, although his analysis is much more complex than my
application suggests. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
109. Anderson v. Minn. Bd. of Barber & Cosmetologist Exam'rs, No. 05-5467 (Min.. Dist. Ct.,
June 10, 2005) (consent decree granting permanent injunction), available at http://www.ij.org/pdf
folder/economic-liberty/mnhairbraiding/MN-HairBraiding-judgement-6-10-05.pdf.
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shaping, chemical hair control, facials and makeup, manicuring, etc.110 In Ohio,
1500 hours. 1l In the states of Washington and California, 1600 hours. 112 As
noted in Section 11.13, many states still have the same regulations for braiders as
cosmetologists.
Courts have generally applied rational basis review in the braiding cases. In
Cornwell,113 the court found that plaintiff Cornwell did not meet the definition
of a cosmetologist because her services were quite limited and the long list of
cosmetology requirements, such as finger waving and pin curling, were
completely irrelevant to her work. The court held that the fit between
California's interest in health and safety and its insistence that Cornwell receive
cosmetology training (less than ten percent of which was relevant to her
business) 114 was too loose, making the licensing requirement arbitrary.
Likewise, the Anderson11 5 court found, for each of Minnesota's cosmetology
licensing requirements, that the training "does not include and is not required
by the Board to include any course, education or training in Hair Braiding." 1
6
Because interpreting the Minnesota licensing law to include braiders would bar
knowledgeable unlicensed braiders from operating but permit licensed
cosmetologists untrained in braiding to perform those services, that
interpretation did not survive rational basis review. 1
7
Not only are the requirements usually arbitrary as applied to braiders, they
may also erect additional barriers to the economic independence of poor black
women who have few marketable skills other than braiding. 1 8 Free market
advocates have aggressively taken up this facet of the braiding regulation
debate, 1 9 and some have argued in favor of deregulation on feminist
grounds. 
20
110. Id. at 4 (quoting MINN. R. 2644.0510 (2003)).
111. Press Release, Institute for Justice, African Hairbraiders Seek To Untangle Regulations (Nov.
16, 1998), available at http://www.ij.org/economic-liberty/oh-hairbraiding/l 1_16_98pr.html.
112. See Hubbard, supra note 71; Dan Richman, Hair Braider's Suit Reveals Tangle Between
Ancient Trade, Modern Laws, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 6, 2004, at El.
113. Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
114. Id. at 1110.
115. Anderson v. Minn. Bd. of Barber & Cosmetologist Exam'rs, No. 05-5467 (June 10, 2005),
available at http://www.ij.org/pdf folder/economicjliberty/mnhairbraiding/MN-HairBraiding
judgement-6-10-05.pdf.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 9.
118. See Braider Licensing Raises Issue of State Regulation vs. Culture, supra note 10.
119. TIMOTHY CARNEY, Regulatory Robber Barons, in THE BIG RIPOFF: How BIG BUSINESS AND
BIG GOVERNMENT STEAL YOUR MONEY (2006), excerpt available at
http://www.cei.org/gencon/019,05426.cfm; Ron Kozar, Upbraiding the Hair Police, The Buckeye
Institute for Public Policy Solutions, http://www.buckeyeinstitute.org/article/269 (last visited Apr. 17,
2006); Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Regulatory Policy: Hair Braiding Regulations Slam Minority
Enterprises, http://www.ncpa.org/pd/regulat/oct97a.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006); Stossel, supra note
70.
120. Donna G. Matias, Association of Libertarian Feminists, Decriminalizing Work,
http://www.alf.org/alfnews/alf64.shtml ("Feminists should note that many of these barriers, like the
licensing of natural haircare practitioners, disproportionately affect women."). One can only speculate
[Vol. 19:125
The Braiding Cases
The training requirements for cosmetologists bear little relevance to the
work braiders do, and the price of cosmetology school may make it more
difficult for poor black women to gain economic independence. But the
unreasonableness of current regulations does not mean that all forms of
regulation would be misguided. A more fitting regulatory scheme would
provide alternative licensing requirements for braiders, mandating only enough
hours to learn proper sanitation, braiding, weaving, and natural hairstyling
techniques. Part V discusses alternative regulatory systems, which are already
in place in several states, in greater detail.
IV. THE BRAIDING CASES, CULTURAL DEFERENCE, AND RACE-SEX BIAS
First, this Part turns to the second question I posed at the outset of this
inquiry: Why have courts and policymakers been so reluctant to scratch the
surface of braiders' arguments? In other words, why have officials yielded to
braiders' demands for deregulation without seriously engaging their claims
about black hair culture? We can better understand this hands-off approach by
examining it through the lens of a ubiquitous issue in the international law
context: the debate between "western human rights" and "non-western culture."
Policymakers have made two notable moves in these cases. First, they have
exercised "cultural deference." 12 1 Second, they have perceived the loudest
black voices, in these cases braiders, as representing the community of black
women, even though the divergent interests of black entrepreneurs and
consumers should be obvious. The adoption of this culturally deferential
heuristic in these cases reveals subtle but notable race-sex bias.
A. The Braiding Cases and Cultural Deference
By "cultural deference," I refer to a heuristic whereby decision-makers
permit actions that would otherwise be impermissible because they are
customary for a recognized group. Cultural deference and the resulting
nonintervention have been noted widely, especially with regard to domestic
about why libertarian groups have so aggressively taken up the cause of black braiders, but one could
imagine that, given the expected political disagreement between free market advocates and black civil
rights advocates, it is effective in "the court of public opinion" for libertarian groups to take up minority
causes. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
121. See also discussion infra Subsection IVA. Note that the main exercisers of cultural deference
in these cases have been legislators. When judges strike down licensing requirements because of
arbitrariness, they do not have the power to replace them with another system. But legislators do, and
they often mention the cultural aspects of braiding as they support eliminating or substantially curtailing
regulations. See Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1104 (S.D. Cal. 1999) ("[T]he Court does
not write laws for the State of California, nor does it mandate new regulatory programs. That is the role
of the Legislature, and state agencies should the Legislature properly delegate such authority.").
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violence against immigrant women. 122 Officials in host countries, asserting that
wife-beating is "an inherent part of [immigrants'] cultural repertoire,"
123
neglect their duty to protect citizens from unnecessary violence. Female genital
cutting is another poignant example of cultural deference. Initially, when
African women asked the World Health Organization (WHO) to intervene in
the practice, WHO refused because it claimed female genital cutting was a
cultural issue, not a medical one.' 24 Though the tide has completely changed-
international organizations now uniformly condemn female genital cutting 
25
-
its proponents continue to view it as an important cultural ritual, and activists
have had relatively little success in eradicating it.' 26 Particularly in the context
of international women's rights, culture has been an excuse for the continuation
of practices that many women, including those who are part of those cultures,
denounce. 1
27
Certainly, having one's hair braided too tightly cannot compare to
domestic violence or involuntary female genital cutting, but the rationale
condoning it is the same. States inadequately protect women members of
minority ethnic groups because some members of the groups allege that a
practice's cultural aspects should make it immune from critique. It is precisely
because the, braiding act seems innocuous that officials who would probably
object to cultural deference in the international women's rights context defer
here.
122. See, e.g., ELEANORE KOFMAN ET AL., GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN EUROPE
101 (2001) ("The case of domestic violence exemplifies the tolerance of practices in the private sphere
on grounds of non-intervention in the customs of others."); Cecilia Menjivar & Olivia Salcido,
Immigrant Women and Domestic Violence: Common Experiences in Different Countries, 16 GENDER &
SOC'Y 898, 901 (2002); see also Salome Mbugua, founder of AkiDwA (African women's sisterhood),
Presentation in Dublin, Ireland (Oct. 28, 2004) (notes on file with author). Ms. Mbugua, an immigrant
to Ireland from Kenya, created a training program for the Gardi (Irish police) after numerous reports of
officers' non-intervention in domestic disputes between African immigrant couples. The program
teaches officers "culturally-sensitive" approaches to domestic intervention.
123. Menjivar & Salcido, supra note 122, at 901.
124. ELIZABETH HEGER BOYLE, FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING: CULTURAL CONFLICT IN THE GLOBAL
COMMUNITY 41 (2005).
125. Id. at 61.
126. IRIN, RAZOR'S EDGE: THE CONTROVERSY OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (2005),
available at http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/FGM/FGM-webspecial.pdf. An encouraging
exception is Senegal, where some rural communities have employed the principles of "the convention
theory" to reduce female genital cutting. See Gerry Mackie, Female Genital Cutting: The Beginning of
the End, in FEMALE "CIRCUMCISION" IN AFRICA: CULTURE, CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE 253 (Bettina
Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund eds., 2000); Gerry Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A
Convention Account, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 999 (1996).
127. See, e.g., WARIS DIRIE & CATHLEEN MILLER, DESERT FLOWER: THE EXTRAORDINARY
JOURNEY OF A DESERT NOMAD (1998); see also UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES: IDENTITIES,
TRADITIONS, AND THIRD WORLD FEMINISM 32-33 (1997) (arguing that distinctions between "Western"
and "non-Western" conceptions of femininity pit women against each other and cripple legitimate
critiques of misogyny); Madhu Kishwar, A Horror of 'Isms': Why I Do Not Call Myself a Feminist, in
OFF THE BEATEN TRACK: RETHINKING GENDER JUSTICE FOR INDIAN WOMEN 268 (1999).
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Cultural deference can be a decision-making approach in any branch of
government. Cornwell128 contains a blatant example of a judge's use of the
heuristic. After the court explains that strict scrutiny is not applicable because
there is no evidence of racial animus, the opinion notes that "[r]ace ... is not
irrelevant to this case."' 29 The court then, in dicta, indicts the State of
California for its denigration of tightly-coiled black hair, claiming that the state
"often refers to coily hair in a pejorative manner" in media such as state-
approved textbooks and final exams1 30 and maintaining that the state "has
embraced this ideology to such an extent that a large percentage of African
Americans have themselves adopted a construction of beauty which equates
straight hair with attractiveness." 13i To support the controversial assertion that
black women straighten their hair because of the "negativity associated with
African-American physical characteristics, ' 32 the court cites the plaintiffs'
own documents and one book about black hair.' 33 It is doubtful that the roughly
seventy-five percent of black women who straighten their hair134 would say that
they do it for these reasons. There are several other reasons one might
straighten her hair, including convenience, versatility, tradition, and economic
mobility, 35 but the court did not second-guess the plaintiffs' assertions on this
point. The defendant State argued that the plaintiffs' conclusions were "mere
personal belief,' 136 but, instead of exercising the usual skepticism, the (white
male) judge deferred to the plaintiffs' assertions about black social pathology.
Administrators have also blatantly exercised cultural deference: To explain
why North Carolina does not regulate braiders, Dee Williams, an enforcement
officer with that state's Board of Cosmetic Arts Examiners, said, "The board
feels it's a black culture thing."
1 37
It is important to note that, although culture-based deference has
discouraged white officials from considering the best interests of black women
in this instance, I do not contend that all culture-based deference is undesirable.
In some cases I would argue that judges and policymakers should exercise
more culture-based deference. For example, if the Rogers employment
discrimination case were heard in a court that deferred to the cultural expertise
128. Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
129. Id. at 1104.
130. Id. at 1105 n.10.
131. Id. at 1105.
132. Id. at 1105 n.ll.
133. Id. (citing ROOKS, supra note 25).
134. Mariame Kaba, When Black Hair Tangles with White Power, in TENDERHEADED, supra note
18, at 102, 103.
135. See, e.g., BYRD & THARPS, supra note 15, at 162; Kaba, supra note 134, at 103-104; Jenyne
M. Raines, Relax Your Mind!, in TENDERHEADED, supra note 18, at 95, 95-101. See also supra note 18
and accompanying text (presenting bell hooks's childhood association of the hair straightening ritual
with black female intimacy).
136. Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1105 n.1 I (S.D. Cal. 1999).
137. Katrice Franklin, Hair Braider Fights To Keep Government Away from Salons, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Aug. 1, 2002, at Al.
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of black women about their hair, it almost certainly would have turned out
differently, and the social position of women of color might have been
recognized by a protected legal status. But the Rogers Court did not defer,
instead questioning the hairstyle's salience in black women's culture due to its
increasing popularity among whites at the time.' 38 Cultural deference is
troubling in the braiding cases because its deployment avoids critical cultural
engagement, and it does not protect consumers' best interests. When the only
conceivable harm was to a mainstream company's conception of
professionalism, the court demanded evidence of what constituted "culture."
When black women's well-being is at stake, officials do not engage in such a
searching inquiry.
B. Cultural Deference and Race-Sex Bias
Understanding the decisions of state officials in these cases as culturally
deferential, while also recognizing that legislatures and courts rarely resort to
this heuristic begs the question: Why have they deferred in these cases? Among
various potential alternatives, I argue that the most compelling response is race-
sex bias.
As applied to these cases, race-sex bias describes prejudice related to
women as a subset of black America: Well-meaning officials view black
America as a culture they cannot know and, thus, defer to braiders' assertions
about black cultural practices. Black women are overwhelmingly the
participants in the relevant cultural practice, which means these instances of
deference have a disparate impact on them. Put differently, black women braid-
wearers are inadequately protected because of their womanhood within a
"foreign" racial group, not because they are "foreign" voices among women.
Admittedly, in many cases this distinction is tenuous, as it is often difficult to
tell precisely how race and sex are working together to produce bias against
women of color. Black feminist and intersectional scholars have been wary of
breaking out which parts of discrimination against women of color are
attributable to their race versus their sex: As Kimberl& Crenshaw notes,
"Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction,
and it may flow in another. .. . [I]f a Black woman is harmed because she is in
the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race
138. The Rogers Court contested Rogers' claim that cornrows have special significance within
black culture, noting that "plaintiff first appeared at work in the all-braided hairstyle on or about
September 25, 1980, soon after the style had been popularized by a white actress in the film '10."'
Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The white actress in question was
Bo Derek. Kenji Yoshino has referred to the Rogers Court's argument as "the Bo Derek defense." Kenji
Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, §6 (Magazine), at 32.
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discrimination."' 39 Black women have faced widespread prejudice within
female communities because of their race. 140 In this case, however, the
mechanics are fairly clear. The distinction is important: decision-makers are
deferring to claims about black culture, not women's culture. 141
Unlike first-generation racism and sexism, the race-sex bias at work in
these cases is likely unconscious. 42 It is probably also well-meaning. Naomi
Wolf describes the racism practiced by herself and that of her social class in her
essay, The Racism of Well-Meaning White People:
[O]ne's racism has to do with how one sees: one experiences one's
own racism more often as a sort of shameful scrim, a dirty curtain
made of the elaborate tissues of fears and inequities that surround and
envelop the fact of race merely because one lives in a racist culture.
143
Wolf continues, "It means spending so much time trying to clear the scrim
away-and hoping to convey that one is indeed trying to clear it away-that
the Other in question is still dimmed and obscured.', 14 4 Scholars of criminal law
have also pointed out this form of racial bias with regard to community
policing. Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares note that, despite efforts by minority
inner-city residents to secure curfews, anti-loitering laws, and random searches;
civil liberties groups have challenged these laws, purportedly because of
concerns about racial bias in law enforcement. 145 Knowledge of the racial
impact of the criminal justice system is so widely available that advocates do
not consider the possibility that minorities can, at least occasionally, use law
139. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139, 149.
140. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 37-38 (1989)
(recounting white feminist academics' devaluation and appropriation of feminist theory by women of
color); Dorothy Gilliam, Reaching Across the Feminist Racial Divide, in SKIN DEEP: BLACK WOMEN
AND WHITE WOMEN WRITE ABOUT RACE 256 (Marita Golden & Susan Richards Shreve eds., 1995)
[hereinafter SKIN DEEP]; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 34, 35-39 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003) (critiquing Catharine
MacKinnon's approach to discussing black women); bell hooks, Feminism in Black and White, in SKIN
DEEP, supra, at 265, 268; Pamela J. Smith, Comment, We Are Not Sisters: Black Women and the
Freedom to Associate and Disassociate, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1467 (1992).
141. See supra Section l.A.
142. For a better understanding of unconscious bias theory, see Charles R. Lawrence IIl's The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
Lawrence's article is the foundational piece on unconscious bias, also known as implicit or cognitive
bias. See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1489 (2005);
Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 481 (2005).
143. Naomi Wolf, The Racism of Well-Meaning White People, in SKIN DEEP, supra note 140, at 37,
43.
144. Id. at 46.
145. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Forward: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1160 (1998) ("Although civil liberties groups purport to be representing inner-city
residents generally when they challenge community policing strategies, their lawsuits are often opposed
by inner-city residents themselves.").
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enforcement to improve their neighborhoods. A similar phenomenon is at work
in the braiding cases. Attempting to be sensitive to the interests of black
women-to clear the scrim away-but unfamiliar with black culture, judges
and policymakers have accepted braiders' assessment of risks with few
questions. Put differently, state officials have tokenized black women braiders,
potentially to the detriment of black women consumers. A more responsible
approach would be for officials to acknowledge that, although relationships
between service providers and consumers may vary cross-culturally to some
degree, the relationships probably have enough in common that providers of
braiding services cannot be presumed to adequately represent the interests of
their patrons.
V. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: RELEVANT BRAID AND NATURAL HAIR
REGULATIONS
How can policymakers both respect black American culture and protect
consumers? This Comment urges policymakers to adopt a strategy that several
states have already employed: developing new regulations tailored specifically
to braiders and natural hair stylists. Instead of eliminating braiding regulation
wholesale or applying irrelevant cosmetology regulations to natural hair
stylists, policymakers should rigorously weigh the risks for black braid-wearers
and the costs of regulation for black braiders to find a policy that serves the
best interests of both groups. Creating new regulations will initially take more
time than all-or-nothing approaches, but regulations provide important
protections for consumers, while making those regulations as minimal as
possible decreases the likelihood that braiders will operate on the black market.
Further, weighing these risks will require critical engagement in this debate
instead of passive acceptance of braiders' cultural claims.
While many states whose licensing regimes are challenged eliminate all
regulation or require only a sanitation lesson, ten states have replaced
traditional cosmetology licensing requirements with more relevant
requirements created specifically for braiders: Florida, 146 Louisiana, 147 New
York,148 Ohio, 14 Oklahoma,15° Pennsylvania,151 South Carolina,1
52
146. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 477.013(9), .0132 (West 2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61G5-
24.019(1), (2) (2007).
147. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 46, §§ XXXI.101(A), XXXI.1 105(A), XXXI.1 107 (2005).
148. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 400(5), 406(2)(b) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 19, § 162.3(a) (2007).
149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4713.01,4713.24, 4713.28(D) & (J) (West 2007).
150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 199.1(11), 199.8 (2000); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 175:10-3-43(b), 10-
9-2(a)(5), 10-9-25 (2005).
151. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 507 (West 2007).
152. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-20(2), 40-7-255, 40-13-230 (2006).
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Tennessee,' 53 Texas, 154 and Virginia. 155 Ironically, the District of Columbia,
where the first braiding case originated, also adopted licensing requirements for
"specialty cosmetologists" in 2003.156 The most reasonable regulatory regimes
are those requiring significant technical training, not merely sanitation training
and a licensing fee. New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia have
achieved the best balance of substantive training requirements with
accessibility for braiders. Oklahoma's system is unique because it allows
braiders to become licensed through apprenticeship, not just classroom time.
Texas has taken a multi-tiered approach to its specialized licensing system,
offering certification in braiding (thirty-five hours) and hair-weaving (three
hundred hours). By contrast, Florida's alternative licensing scheme is poorly
thought out, with very minimal requirements of a sixteen-hour sanitation course
and a twenty-five dollar biennial fee. Florida did not include those who add hair
extensions in their definition of "braiders," even though professional braiders
add hair extensions routinely. While each state must make its own
determinations regarding training requirements, every state should
communicate both with braiders and braid-wearers in order to avoid ill-
conceived policy.
The Institute for Justice (IJ) opposes specialty licensing, stating "[T]his is
hairbraiding, not brain surgery. Training is utterly unnecessary to protect the
public; safety concerns can easily be addressed by reading a simple
pamphlet."' 157 Their arguments bring to mind those of civil libertarian groups
opposed to community policing in the work of Kahan and Meares. Despite
evidence that braiding is not, in fact, harmless to black women, IJ justifies its
position through appeals on behalf of black women. Many braiders oppose
specialized licensing as well. Taalib Uqdah has called on braiders to openly
defy Pennsylvania's new licensing law requiring 150-300 hours of training,
158
and other braiders cite culture and experience as the only important
qualifications to be a hair braider.1 59 However, some braiders support--or at
least understand-the benefits of specialized licensing. 16 Many of the news
reports on braiding regulations do not contain viewpoints from customers,
153. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-4-102(a)(14) & (15), 62-4-110(f) (West 2006).
154. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1602.002(a)(2) (Vernon 2007).
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-700 (West 2007).
156. D.C. CODE § 47-2853.06(c) (2007); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 17, §§ 3702.1(c)(1), 3703.9 (2005);
50 D.C. REG. 7699 (Sept. 12, 2003); see also Public Notice, http://www.asisvcs.com/publications/pdf/
680959.pdf.
157. BAYHAM, supra note 63.
158. Kaya Casper, Posting of 01:13 EST, Naturally You! Magazine: Behind the Naps!, Dec. 23,
2006, http://naturallyyoumagazine.blogspot.com/2006/10/call-to-openly-defy-braiding-laws_ O.html
(reporting a press release from Taalib Din Uqdah calling on braiders to openly defy Pennsylvania's new
licensing law).
159. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
160. See Braider Licensing Raises the Issue of State Regulation vs. Culture, supra note 10.
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which reveals a bias in the determination of whose stories are important in the
braiding cases. 61
Despite opposition from libertarians (who oppose virtually all regulation)
and industry insiders, a specialized training requirement is a positive step for
several reasons. First and most obviously, it ensures that braiders have some
knowledge of how best to foster black women's hair health. Second, it teaches
braiders necessary information for perfecting their craft, while not burdening
them with other information that is unnecessary and costly to acquire. Third, it
ensures that licensed braiders can give knowledgeable advice to their clients,
which empowers black women consumers. Fourth, it professionalizes the
industry, which offers benefits for the entrepreneur as well as the customer. The
advantages of professionalizing domestic industries have been noted, especially
with regard to childcare. Community groups like All Our Kin, in New Haven,
Connecticut, give women opportunities to earn child development certificates
that help women see themselves not as babysitters, but as child care
professionals.' 62 A similar dynamic can occur within the braiding industry-
there are benefits to training requirements for both braiders and braid-wearers.
Finally, although detractors have noted that licensing requirements have the
effect of creating a "black market" for braids, 163 the state should fulfill its
responsibility to provide legal structures for protecting consumers by rationally
regulating the industry. The fact that some will break the law is not a sufficient
reason for legislative inactivity.
CONCLUSION
Black women's hair might appear, at first, a trivial issue. But, given the
cultural lineage, social salience, and economic implications of hair, the
regulation of the braiding industry is an issue worthy of academic attention.
The erroneous belief that braiding is essentially risk-free has animated a
number of poorly thought-out policy decisions and has meant that braid-
wearers have less legal protection than people who do not wear braids. To
address this disparity, this Comment urges state legislatures to create
specialized licensing policies for braiders in consultation with both braiders and
braid-wearers.
161. There are a couple of exceptions. One eighteen-year-old Virginia customer concluded that
"[b]raiding without a license is not necessarily a bad thing" since she wasn't personally aware of "many
people who have had bad reactions to braids." Braiding Without a License?, supra note 10. A more
complex answer came from a twenty-seven-year-old Philadelphia customer, who remarked that "[The
braider] got licensed to braid my hair when I paid her." Braider Licensing Raises Issue of State
Regulation vs. Culture, supra note 10. This statement might suggest that the customer believes that
consumers of braiding services should bear the risks of braiding, without regulatory involvement.
162. See All Our Kin, Inc., http://www.allourkin.org/parents.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
163. E.g., Anderson v. Minn. Bd. of Barber & Cosmetologist Exam'rs, No. 05-5467 (Minn. Dist.
Ct., June 10, 2005), at 23; Paghdiwala, supra note 1.
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The fact that most braiders and braid-wearers are black women illuminates
another, more complicated culprit: race-sex bias. Race-sex bias impedes well-
intentioned decision-makers' ability to think critically about how legal rules
affect minority women. When the challenged law deals in cultural currency,
well-intentioned decision-makers are paralyzed and thereby defer to a small
group's subjective assessment of cultural practice. This issue is much more
difficult to remedy. On one hand, it is important for decision-makers to be
culturally sensitive. Adapting the law to create space for cultural practice is,
generally speaking, a societal good. On the other hand, cultural sensitivity has
to mean something deeper than uncritical acceptance of potentially
(un)representative minority women's claims. This Comment supports a richer
conception of non-racist and non-sexist policymaking, one that takes into
account the voices of all minority women, and by analogy, any potentially-
affected group. In order for states to develop and interpret law that is as free of
bias as possible, courts and policymakers must "look to the bottom"16 4-the
whole bottom.
Of course, decision-makers who are not part of underrepresented cultures
may encounter challenges when attempting to critically analyze cultural
practices like braiding. This reality is part of the rationale for a more diverse
bar, bench, and legislature. However, it is not enough for officials to merely
rely on minorities, women, LGBT people, disabled people, or other members of
underrepresented communities to be "the voice" for their respective groups.
Fundamentally, the "critical engagement" approach I suggest here involves a
paradigm shift: officials must see the commonalities between black women's
businesses and mainstream businesses, without undue deference to cultural
claims. While it may be difficult to tease out when cultural deference is
appropriate and when it is not, justice demands that officials make the effort.
164. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) ("[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special
voice to which we should listen.").
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